Sheikh Hasina Return: Is Bangladesh’s Political Position Changing?

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For nearly two years, Sheikh Hasina’s presence in India has remained one of the most sensitive issues in relations between New Delhi and Dhaka. Bangladesh has repeatedly sought her extradition, while India has maintained that the request is being examined under the countries’ extradition framework.

At first glance, the political message from Dhaka appeared straightforward: Sheikh Hasina should return to Bangladesh and face the legal process there. But recent developments suggest that the situation may be more complicated than it first appeared.

The most striking signal has come from Bangladesh’s political opposition to Hasina. Jamaat-e-Islami, which has long taken a strongly hostile position toward the former prime minister, has recently appeared more open to the possibility of her returning to Bangladesh. At the same time, figures associated with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, or BNP, have reportedly engaged in discussions with Jamaat leaders.

That does not necessarily mean that Bangladesh has abandoned its demand for Hasina’s extradition. It does, however, raise a bigger question: is Dhaka beginning to search for a political solution that could allow Hasina to return without turning her presence into an immediate crisis?

The question has gained urgency because Tarique Rahman, who has taken charge of Bangladesh’s government after winning the election, has also been attempting to manage a difficult relationship with India.

For months, the expectation was that Rahman would eventually visit New Delhi. India had invited him, and diplomatic contacts between the two countries had gradually increased. Yet that visit now appears to be moving more slowly than expected.

The immediate obstacle, according to the political narrative emerging from Dhaka, is once again Sheikh Hasina.

Bangladesh has demanded that India return Hasina. The country’s political leadership has repeatedly linked the improvement of bilateral relations with progress on the issue. At the same time, New Delhi has signalled that its relationship with Bangladesh cannot be reduced entirely to the question of one individual.

This has created a diplomatic balancing act for both sides.

Tarique Rahman cannot ignore the political sentiment inside Bangladesh, particularly among groups that remain deeply opposed to Hasina. India, meanwhile, has its own strategic interests in maintaining stable relations with a neighbouring country that shares a long border, major rivers and extensive economic links with it.

The situation became even more complicated after Sheikh Hasina announced that she wanted to return to Bangladesh.

According to the account presented in the source material, Hasina’s political camp has indicated that she wants to go back to Bangladesh in December. That statement immediately changed the political conversation because the former prime minister faces serious legal proceedings in Bangladesh.

A Bangladeshi court has sentenced Hasina to death in connection with cases linked to the violence during the July-August 2024 unrest. Her supporters have rejected the accusations and questioned the legal process, while her opponents have continued to demand accountability for the deaths during the uprising.

For Bangladesh, therefore, Hasina’s return is not simply an immigration or extradition issue. It is tied directly to the political legacy of the 2024 uprising and the question of what should happen to the former leader of the Awami League.

Yet the latest statements from Jamaat-e-Islami have introduced a different dimension.

Abdullah Mohammad Taher, a senior Jamaat leader, has reportedly said that his party would not have a problem with Hasina returning to Bangladesh. More significantly, he indicated that even a future return of the Awami League to political power would not automatically be unacceptable.

That is a notable shift in tone from the uncompromising rhetoric that surrounded Hasina after the fall of her government.

It is important, however, not to interpret the statement as an endorsement of Hasina or the Awami League. Jamaat remains a major political opponent of the former ruling party. What has changed is the apparent willingness to discuss political competition rather than simply demand the permanent exclusion of Hasina and her party.

The distinction matters.

If Bangladesh’s major political forces begin moving from the language of punishment toward the language of political competition, it could create room for a negotiated arrangement. Such an arrangement would still have to deal with the court cases against Hasina, but the political environment surrounding her return could look very different.

The BNP’s position adds another layer to the story.

Tarique Rahman’s party has historically been one of the principal opponents of Hasina. Yet reports of BNP figures meeting Jamaat representatives over the issue suggest that political parties are discussing how the post-Hasina political landscape should be managed.

For Rahman, this is a difficult calculation.

He needs to maintain his political standing at home, where opposition to Hasina remains strong. At the same time, Bangladesh cannot easily afford a prolonged confrontation with India.

The geography alone makes that impossible.

India and Bangladesh share a long land boundary and numerous rivers. Their economies are connected through trade, transport and energy cooperation. Bangladesh also depends on regional connectivity that runs through or involves India, while New Delhi has significant strategic interests in maintaining stability on its eastern flank.

This explains why India has continued diplomatic engagement with Dhaka despite the disagreements over Hasina.

The signs of renewed engagement became more visible after Rahman took office. India sent Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla to his swearing-in ceremony, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi conveyed an invitation for Rahman to visit India.

The message from New Delhi appeared clear: the political differences of the previous period should not permanently define the relationship between the two countries.

But Rahman also had reasons to delay the trip.

The political environment inside Bangladesh had changed dramatically after the events of 2024. Anti-India sentiment had grown among sections of the population, while India’s decision to allow Hasina to remain in the country became a major political issue in Dhaka.

Any early visit by Rahman to New Delhi therefore risked being portrayed by his opponents as a concession to India.

That political risk has remained significant.

India, meanwhile, appears to have continued working through diplomatic and security channels.

The reported meetings involving India’s high commissioner, senior intelligence officials and Bangladeshi security authorities suggest that the relationship is being discussed at several levels, not merely through public diplomacy.

According to the information provided, India’s intelligence chief travelled to Dhaka and met Bangladeshi officials, while India’s high commissioner also held talks with Rahman. The diplomatic activity was followed by a meeting in New Delhi with Prime Minister Modi.

Such contacts are not unusual between neighbouring states. Intelligence and security officials routinely meet when countries share borders and face cross-border security concerns. But the timing has attracted attention because it coincided with attempts to create conditions for a possible Rahman visit to India.

Then came another complication.

On August 5, Sheikh Hasina held a press conference. Bangladesh had reportedly asked India to prevent such an event, fearing that it could inflame political tensions. India’s response was that the event was a private function and that it had limited ability to prevent it.

The reaction in Bangladesh was sharp.

According to the account provided, several major Bangladeshi newspapers did not carry the event prominently, but footage circulated online and eventually reached a wider Bangladeshi audience.

For Dhaka, the episode was more than a media controversy. It reinforced the perception that Hasina continued to possess a political platform from Indian soil.

Within days, the diplomatic atmosphere surrounding a possible Rahman visit appeared to deteriorate.

A report in The Hindu on August 14 suggested that Rahman could visit India toward the end of August or in early September. Two days later, Bangladesh’s Foreign Ministry publicly referred to ongoing efforts regarding the proposed visit but also linked the atmosphere to Hasina’s August 5 appearance.

The message from Dhaka was unmistakable: Bangladesh wanted its concerns to be acknowledged before the relationship could move forward.

That position was reinforced by Foreign Affairs Adviser Humayun Kabir, who said on August 20 that there should be no rush over Rahman’s India visit and that he would travel to India when the timing was right. Reports that he would visit during August were described as inaccurate.

This means the much-discussed India visit may not happen as quickly as earlier reports suggested.

There is another issue complicating the relationship: the murder case involving Osman Hadi.

Hadi was shot dead during the election campaign in December last year. Two suspects, Faisal Karim Masud and Alamgir Hussain, were reportedly arrested by the West Bengal Special Task Force in March 2026 after entering India.

Bangladesh has sought their return.

The case has become another point of friction because Dhaka sees the suspects as individuals who should face justice in Bangladesh, while Indian authorities must deal with them according to Indian law and the legal procedures governing their custody and transfer.

Thus, the Hasina issue is no longer the only question standing between the two governments.

The broader relationship now involves extradition, security cooperation, cross-border crime, political sovereignty and the question of how far either country is willing to accommodate the other’s demands.

There is also a wider international dimension.

Bangladesh is trying to balance its relationships with India, China and the United States. None of these relationships can easily be sacrificed.

China is an important economic and infrastructure partner. The United States remains a major international and economic actor. India is Bangladesh’s immediate neighbour, a major trading partner and a country with which Dhaka shares rivers, borders and security interests.

This makes Bangladesh’s foreign policy a delicate exercise in balancing competing interests.

Some political voices in Bangladesh have suggested that external pressure, including pressure from Washington, may be influencing decisions in Dhaka. Such claims should be treated cautiously unless supported by clear evidence. Nevertheless, the fact that such allegations are circulating demonstrates the sensitivity surrounding Bangladesh’s foreign-policy choices.

The United States, China and India all have different strategic interests in Bangladesh. Dhaka therefore has strong reasons to avoid becoming overly dependent on any single external power.

For India, however, there is another issue that could become decisive later this year: the Ganga Water Treaty.

The 1996 agreement between India and Bangladesh is due to expire in December 2026 after a 30-year term. The treaty governs the sharing of Ganga waters during the dry season through the Farakka Barrage system.

Its renewal could become one of the most important tests of the relationship between New Delhi and Dhaka.

Bangladesh wants the existing arrangement renewed, while concerns have grown in parts of India over whether the agreement adequately addresses the needs of Indian states, particularly Bihar and West Bengal.

The political debate in India has already begun.

Bihar, in particular, has raised concerns about water availability, sedimentation and the wider impact of the Farakka system. Sanjay Jha, a senior Janata Dal (United) leader and Rajya Sabha member, has argued that the treaty should be examined from the perspective of Bihar’s changing population and water requirements.

His argument is politically important because the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance depends on regional allies such as the JD(U).

If opposition to the treaty grows in Bihar, New Delhi will have to balance its foreign-policy objectives with domestic political pressure.

The situation has parallels with the long-running debate over the Teesta River agreement, which has faced resistance in West Bengal.

That is why the Ganga Water Treaty could become more than a technical water-sharing agreement. It could become a major bargaining point in India-Bangladesh relations.

For Tarique Rahman, this may eventually provide an additional reason to engage directly with New Delhi.

India needs a stable relationship with Bangladesh. Bangladesh needs continued access to economic, trade and regional opportunities involving India. Both sides have disputes, but neither benefits from allowing those disputes to destroy the wider relationship.

That is where Sheikh Hasina’s future becomes critical.

If Dhaka continues to demand her extradition as a precondition for meaningful engagement, India-Bangladesh relations could remain trapped in a single issue.

If, however, Bangladesh’s political parties find a way to separate Hasina’s legal accountability from the broader question of bilateral relations, there could be space for a compromise.

The recent Jamaat comments may be an early indication of such political flexibility, although it would be premature to describe them as evidence of a definitive change in Bangladesh’s official policy.

The BNP faces an equally difficult balancing act. Tarique Rahman needs India for strategic and economic reasons, but he cannot afford to appear indifferent to public anger over Hasina.

New Delhi faces its own dilemma.

Handing Hasina over could satisfy one of Dhaka’s most important demands but would carry enormous political and legal implications. Refusing to do so could continue to strain relations with Bangladesh.

India’s stated position has therefore remained cautious: examine the extradition request under the relevant treaty framework and then take a decision.

That cautious approach gives New Delhi room to negotiate while avoiding a premature commitment.

For now, the central question is not simply whether Sheikh Hasina will return to Bangladesh.

The bigger question is whether Bangladesh can find a political arrangement under which her return, her legal cases and the future of the Awami League can be handled without triggering another round of instability.

If such an arrangement emerges, it could dramatically change the India-Bangladesh equation.

It could also remove one of the biggest obstacles to Tarique Rahman’s engagement with New Delhi.

December may therefore become a crucial month.

By then, the Ganga Water Treaty will be approaching its renewal deadline, Bangladesh will have to decide how it wants to manage its relationship with India, and the question of Hasina’s future could become even more politically urgent.

The developments of the coming months will show whether the apparent softening in some Bangladeshi political statements represents a genuine change in strategy or merely a temporary tactical adjustment.

For India, the objective is likely to remain broader than Sheikh Hasina. New Delhi has an interest in a stable, predictable and cooperative Bangladesh.

For Dhaka, the challenge is equally clear: protect its political sovereignty and domestic interests without allowing relations with its largest neighbouring country to deteriorate beyond repair.

And for Sheikh Hasina, the stakes are personal as well as political.

After nearly two years in India, her stated desire to return home has once again placed her at the centre of Bangladesh’s political debate.

Whether that return leads to confrontation, a legal battle, a negotiated political arrangement or another diplomatic crisis remains uncertain.

But one thing is increasingly clear: the politics surrounding Sheikh Hasina’s return are no longer as straightforward as they appeared immediately after the fall of her government.

The winds in Dhaka may be shifting. The real question is in which direction they will blow.